Personnel Security: A Musical Journey, guided by Warren Zevon

(previously published elsewhere, now back home)


Warren Zevon: An Infosec Musical Journey

One analogy I learned early in my career is that Information security is a three-legged stool, consisting of Computer Security, Physical Security and Personnel Security.  Compromise one of these legs and the stool falls over.

In some cases involving access to highly sensitive information, personnel security involves plumbing the depths of people's personal histories, up to and including very intrusive interviews and polygraphs.  This part of information security is something that most practitioners and managers don't have to deal with, other than interfacing with HR or the personnel security office during the hiring process.

Where is the nexus between personal conduct and being trustworthy to protect sensitive information?  That depends, amongst other factors, on the level of sensitivity of the information and the type of organization granting access to the information.

Let's take a musical journey through personnel security and rediscover an old classic, Lawyers, Guns and Money, by Warren Zevon.

According to Zevon, he wrote the lyrics to Lawyers, Guns and Money on wet cocktail napkins, while on vacation in Kauai, "after a long day of improbable and grotesque mischief."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5puAN1PGQw (mostly safe for work, has one four letter word that starts with S).

Let's analyze what we can learn from Zevon's lyrics as practitioners of information security, assuming that the subject of the song has sensitive information in his head and is being targeted for exploitation:

I went home with the waitress, the way I always do
How was I to know she was with the Russians too?

This is a classic honeypot situation, where an adversary uses an attractive person to get the target into a compromising position, in quite the literal sense, after which the target may be coerced to betray his country or captured for interrogation, or just killed.

Honeypots are fixtures of spy movie plots, from the James Bond franchise to Munich to The Good Shepherd.

One real life case of 'she was with the Russians' is that of Clayton Lonetree, who was in a sensitive US embassy security position in Moscow... http://www.hanford.gov/c.cfm/oci/ci_spy.cfm?dossier=72

A more recent example, more on point to information security, is the case of the missing Blackberry belonging to the aide to the British Prime Minister during a visit to China.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-5775.html

More lyrics:

I was gambling in Havana
I took a little risk
Send lawyers, guns and money
Dad, get me outta this

This is another classic weakness that can result in becoming a more exploitable target, since gambling can become an addiction and result in grave financial hardship. Eventually someone with bad intentions may notice the weakness and may attempt to recruit the subject by using coercion or quid pro quo services demanded by people seeking cooperation from the target.  "We give you money to take care of the gambling debts, the loan sharks won't break your bones and hey, no big deal, it's just some information, not like it's gonna hurt anybody..."

Next, we hear Zevon's character denying responsibility for his situation, declaring himself a victim of circumstance and bad luck:

I'm the innocent bystander
and somehow I got stuck
between a rock and a hard place
and I'm down on my luck

This denial of responsibility displays a lack of maturity and ability to recognize and correct personal flaws, which we all have to some degree.  This is perhaps the worst offense committed by the subject of the song.

The US State Department website has a listing of the elements of the Whole Person concept that may be relevant to the adjudication of a background investigation for a security clearance.  (Note that different parts of the US Government have different security-related priorities and bureacratic mechanisms, so there is not one place for a federal clearance).

http://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/60321.htm

If you read through the webpage, you'll find that Zevon's lyrics included behavior that would fall under several areas of concern in the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility to Classified Information:

Guideline D on Sexual Behavior, referring to "sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress" as one of the specific concerns in the guideline.

Guideline F on Financial Considerations (explicitly mentioning compulsive gambling), and

Guideline E on Personal Conduct, which includes lack of full and open cooperation with investigators who are charged with determining if the subject of the investigation is trustworthy enough to obtain and keep a clearance. Specifically,  "Refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination."

One good site for more specific examples of personnel security decisions is the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), you can read about actual situations where people were denied clearances or lost them and appealed their cases to DOHA.  These cases illustrate the balancing act involved in deciding whether to grant or deny a clearance and the legal underpinnings of the clearance adjudication process.

Many years of actual cases, including the latest ones from December 2011:
http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/doha/industrial/2011.html

The Adjudicative Desk Reference may be used as a guide by administrative judges and others in determining the outcome of personnel security matters.  http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/products.html#ADR   The reference was created by the Defense Department's Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) as a tool to assist in making difficult decisions regarding suitability for cleared work.

Other products from PERSEREC may be of interest to those involved in HR, Insider Threat and Workplace Violence and other areas of research: Use with caution, this is not an exact science...  The first link includes a pointer to a 2011 "Ethnographic Analysis of Second Life."  http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports.html and  http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/products.html

The Cons They Are a Changin'

I took some time off of #TSASongs to bring you this tribute to BSides security conferences.

http://www.securitybsides.com/


Please sing along with me, to the tune of Bob Dylan's The Times They Are a Changin'

A Parody with a message...


Come gather round Tweeple wherever you roam
and admit that the BSides around you have grown
and accept it that soon you'll need skillz that are honed
if your time to you is worth savin
then you better start learnin or you’ll sink like a stone

for the times they are a changin


come PR flacks and keynotes who dominate with your spend
and keep your eyes wide the chance won’t come again
and don’t hype too soon for the FUD’s still in spin
there’s no tellin who that its shamin'
for the loser now will be later to win

for the times they are a changin

come vendors and pitchmen, please heed the call
don’t sell in the doorway don’t flog up the hall
for he that gets hurt will be he who cold called
the battle outside ragin
will soon shake your Windows, bypass your firewalls

for the times they are a changin

come conference planners throughout the land
and don’t criticize what you can’t understand
our cons and our parties are beyond your command
your old road is rapidly aging
please get outta the new one if you can’t lend your hand

for the times they are a changin

the line it is drawn, the curse it is cast
the expensive cons now will lose people fast
as the closed cons now will later be past
the order is rapidly fadin
but the BSides con is a guaranteed blast

for the times they are a changin

---------------------------------------------------------------


Dedicated to the BSides crew and volunteers.

All my (g)love,

@Shpantzer

Send In The Clowns (RIAA's Embarrassing Pursuits)

Have you ever sat yourself down and wondered: Hey, just how lame is RIAA's ability to do technical detection of 'copyright infringement' or whatever it is they're calling it these days?

Well, it turns out there is good evidence that the lameness goes even deeper than the already low expectations we have become accustomed to from this group.

It's not like RIAA's lameness is any news, really... Some of the most sober and respected leaders of the information security community have called RIAA out for their wayward ways. No less than Dr. Eugene Schultz, not known for being overly hyperbolic in his word choice, spoke of the RIAA:

"Clearly, clowns rule the circus when it comes to at least some of the RIAA’s witch hunts."
http://blog.emagined.com/2008/07/08/the-entertainment-industry-and-copyright-violation-crackdowns-how-much-is-too-much/

How can I top that kind of piledriver-by-blog? I'm nowhere near as smart nor eloquent as Dr. Schultz.

So why do I add to this criticism of RIAA, after all these years of silence?

Because, dear readers, the technical evidence is really starting to get to me (I know it's almost 2010... ok, ok...)

Previously, I posted about ridiculous RIAA letters coming to University of Washington researchers (http://dmca.cs.washington.edu)

The last straw came recently, when I sat through a lecture at a Dartmouth infosec conference and had to keep picking my jaw up off the floor, time after time, as a computer science professor and law professor described in detail how they toiled to save a poor soul from the cold, unrelenting wrath of RIAA's legal attack dogs.

The poor soul in question had no computer in her home at the time of the alleged infringement...

Here it is, the evidence (as if we needed more of it), just so you too can say "Now I know" the answer to the question above (the one about the depths of RIAA's lameness):

Summary of victory against RIAA by Professor Embree from Franklin Pierce Law School:
http://www.piercelaw.edu/news/posts/2009-06-18-victory-in-downloading-case.php

The letter from Ms. Mavis Roy, the would-be-victim of RIAA's ridiculous behavior, thanking the staff of the law clinic run by Professor Embree:
http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/release-mavis-letter.pdf

The expert report by Professor Bratus (techies, get a snack and a comfy chair, this is good stuff):
http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/release-mavis-case-expert-report.pdf

Bio of the heroic Professor Embree http://www.piercelaw.edu/ashlynlembree/index.php


And so, in the tradition of legislating from the blog bench (yes I can do that)...

Previously, I brought you Shpantzer's Law of Endpoint Security (http://shpantzer.blogspot.com/2009/04/shpantzers-law-of-endpoint-security.html)

Today, I bring you Shpantzer's Law of RIAA Law(suits):

I propose that from now on, anytime you post anything about RIAA going after obviously innocent people, then you must type/sing/hum a legally correct snippet of Send In The Clowns. Maybe just a bar or two, check with your favorite entertainment lawyer.

It'll be like our little inside joke. Only you and the eight people who read this blog will know! It's like being a part of an elite secret society, just without the hazing!

My personal favorite is Grace Jones' disco version, cuz hey, go cheesy or go home! Streisand, Judy Dench, Mel Torme, Frank Sinatra, or any such personality will do in a pinch. It's all there on the intertubes to enjoy.

For now.

Send In The Clowns...

Or SEND IN ZEE CLOWNS! (Frau Farbissina from Austin Powers style)



PS MediaSentry, whose technical failures are described in the technical report, is not doing RIAA's dirty work any longer, last time I checked.

PPS For a list of many people who performed and recorded this song:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Send_in_the_Clowns

(Krusty The Klown, shoulda known)

DRM Watch now CopyrightandTechnology Blog

The DRMWatch website is now (for some time) http://copyrightandtechnology.com/

Bill Rosenblatt compiles stories and commentary about Copyright, Digital Rights Management, Watermarking and other copyright-related technology and the strategic moves made by tech companies, copyright holders and enforces, congresscritters, ISPs and other players in the crazy copyright scene.

Word of the Day: Life Password

Help your friends and family avoid using a Life Password...

Life Password
May 19, 2009 Urban Word of the Day from UrbanDictionary.com

The password that you use for every website, email account, facebook, twitter, everything. Having a 'life password' is not a good idea, but everyone does it.

My friend found out my life password and wrecked my facebook account, stole all my paypal money and emailed offensive images to my mother.

Professionalism in the Security Community, Part Deux (Clever Talkers)

In this post, I will try to be clever and use the word 'clever' and its variations as much as reasonably possible. It might make me seem clever, or just obviously annoyed at the would-be clever cynics, you decide... As I've posted before, in the first installment of Professionalism, there are people (Marcus Ranum being one) who are both clever AND have a framework in which they discuss and enumerate specific arguments, definitions, etc.

This post is aimed not at them, as I don't have an issue with being clever, in fact I love to laugh and humor gets me through the day. I just have an issue with being clever as a complete substitute for real thinking. I mention no names and link to no specific articles, to avoid flame wars and to protect the guilty. :-) Here goes...

Rant Mode ON:

Dear Readers, Cyberwarriors, Those-Who-Follow-The-Cyberwar-on-"What-Is-Cyberwar," and of course Those-Who-Just-Like-Clever-Articles-About-Cyberwar:

There is a lot of discussion about cyberwar these days, which is probably a good thing, because we STILL need to figure out exactly what it is and isn't. Perhaps parallel to that effort (sigh...) we might be able to formulate a (reasonably) realistic strategy that will mitigate the effects of cyberwar on our side, allow our cyberwar practitioners to exploit the other side's networked weaknesses (war is about sides at some point, sorry) and be nimble enough to change with the speed of the network.

Cyberwar discussions are difficult for many reasons. One of them is the notion that we must not only prosecute said cyberwar properly on the strategic and tactical levels, to achieve certain results and avoid others, we must also strictly adhere, of course, to the laws of war (which ones again?) and we must be highly pundit-and-lawyer aware.


According to some, the tools and rules of cyberwar must be approved by multiple and conflicting interests, including, but not limited to: The Red Cross, John Yoo, the ACLU, Karl Rove, Katrina vanden Heuvel, EFF, current DoJ lawyers, EPIC, former DoJ lawyers (did I mention Yoo yet?), Pat Buchanan, Arianna Huffington, Ms. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, General Jack D. Ripper, the ghost of General Curtis LeMay (via the Ouija board) and of course, the highly esteemed and indefatigable cyberwarrior, Dr. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.


See, I wasn't being TOO clever in that last paragraph, was I? OK, maybe too clever, but perhaps, and sadly so, not clever enough to qualify for the bevy of (cleverly) sarcastic and cynical articles about the supposed exploitation of the cyberwar issue by the various powers that be (are these powers 'the gummint' or 'the mainstream media' or are they think-tank thinker types?)

Apparently, some people think it's good enough to just be clever (or better yet, cynically clever), about the "cynical exploitation" alleged in their articles. These cynical mentions of cynical exploitation of cyberwar as a topic are sometimes explicit and sometimes more implicit (which is always more clever than actually being explicit).

For some people, being clever seems to be the main thing to strive for. Interestingly, some of these same people are the ones who deride FUD in the vendor space and yet fail to see the irony of their wayward ways. Are they falling into that trap of logical fallacy, you know the one that makes people think that making fun of someone or something (or both) is in and of itself the argument, or boosts the argument? Sorry folks, you can't just be clever and create an argument that's that implicit, not well articulated, or at times not even mentioned at all, strictly by means of making fun of people and concepts.



Argue by argument, not just cleverness. Derision is not discussion.


Are we trying to audition for the Daily Show correspondent position or are we talking about strategic warfare in cyberspace? Oh, both, I see...


Allow me to throw this thought-grenade onto the tinderbox of the cyberwar ABOUT cyberwar:

Being clever is great, and perhaps necessary, when discussing such amorphous topics. It is not helpful, however, to stop at being clever, to fail to continue with what you actually think cyberwar is, what it is not, and what you think is a good way to advance the discussion.

I will cleverly, but not cynically, stop now, having pointed out the clever fact that being clever about cyberwar is necessary but not sufficient to advance the discussion about cyberwar.


It is just the beginning. It might even be good to end with being clever. It is not, however, the end and should not even be the sole means to that end.

Read that as a promise that I'll discuss it further, and not rest on my clever laurels.



Rant Mode Off. Clever hammer back in toolbox. For now.

Shpantzer's Law of Endpoint Security (Grand Belated Unveiling!)

Just going through some old emails this morning and I found this little unpublished gem. Revealed to the public for the first time, right here, right now (drumroll please...)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Shpantzer's Law of Endpoint Security

Body: "The security of your endpoint (hence your network) is inversely proportional to the square of the number of applications installed on the endpoint."

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This was from April 28, 2007. Hey, that's two years ago! Why didn't I publish this? I guess I'm just kinda shy that way sometimes...

Basically the issue emphasized here (did I mention this was two years ago, all the way back in April of 2007?) is that application security matters, on the client side too, and not just the OS.

Browsers, PDF readers, media players, apps for presentation, email, spreadsheets, you name it. They're all individually dangerous and can add vulnerabilities really quickly when combined. I surmised that the relationship between the number of apps and security is most likely nonlinear. Inverse square sounded good at the time!

I wonder what other buried treasure is in those old emails...

Gal